Jumping into Bitcoin News Today, France’s cybersecurity agency ANSSI (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information) announced at the annual France Quantum conference that it will stop certifying security products lacking quantum-resistant encryption from 2027, with a full transition deadline for companies set at 2030, a mandate that applies to French government agencies and critical infrastructure operators by regulatory requirement, and arrives as Glassnode’s May 2026 report identifies 6.04 million BTC, approximately 30.2% of the issued supply, as carrying public keys visible on-chain.
This is not simply a European procurement rule. It is the most concrete government-issued deadline yet for deprecating classical public-key cryptography, and it arrives at a moment when the Bitcoin security community is actively quantifying how much of the network’s supply is structurally exposed to a functional quantum computer.
Bitcoin Security News Today: How Glassnode Breaks Down the 6.04 Million BTC Exposure
Glassnode separates the exposed supply into two distinct categories. The first is 1.92 million BTC (~9.6% of supply), which are labeled structurally exposed, outputs that reveal the public key by design, including P2PK (pay-to-public-key) outputs from Satoshi-era mining rewards, bare multisig scripts, and Taproot (P2TR) outputs. The second is 4.12 million BTC (~20.6%) classified as operationally exposed, where public keys became visible through address reuse, partial UTXO spending, or custodial practices.
The report’s analytical emphasis is notable: Glassnode stresses that the primary risk lies in current storage practices rather than ancient coins. Exchanges account for an estimated 1.63–1.66 million BTC of the operationally exposed set. By contrast, US, UK, and El Salvador sovereign BTC holdings reportedly show zero quantum exposure, suggesting those positions use non-exposed UTXO types. The 13.99 million BTC (~69.8%) with no public-key exposure at rest are considered safe under Glassnode’s framework.
The threat mechanism is well-defined. Bitcoin’s transaction signing relies on ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) over the secp256k1 curve, with security grounded in the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem. A fault-tolerant quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could recover a private key from any public key already visible on-chain, meaning the 6.04 million BTC with exposed keys would be directly at risk once Q-Day arrives. Hash-of-pubkey outputs, such as P2PKH, carry an additional layer of protection until they are spent.
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Post-Quantum Cryptography: ANSSI’s Mandate and the Compressing Timeline
ANSSI Chief of Staff Samih Souissi, speaking at the France Quantum conference, framed the policy shift in terms that extend well beyond technical standards. “It’s not only a technical issue. It’s a matter of governance, industrial planning, regulation, and sovereignty,” Souissi said.
The agency’s roadmap calls for organizations to inventory sensitive data by end-2026, map affected systems by end-2027, and complete migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by 2030.
The timeline aligns with, and in some respects accelerates, signals from other large institutions. In March 2026, Google set an internal 2029 deadline to transition its systems to PQC. Quantum security firm Project Eleven estimated in May 2026 that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could arrive as early as 2030.
NIST has indicated an intent to deprecate classical public-key schemes, including RSA and ECC, by approximately 2030 and end their use by around 2035, timelines that large software vendors are now building into hardware security module and operating system roadmaps.
Academic research cited at DEF CON 33 suggests that as few as 1,754 logical qubits could, under optimistic scaling assumptions, be sufficient to attack secp256k1-based blockchains, though most experts place a realistic threat window at ten to twenty years out.
Earlier quantitative work placed the exposed BTC figure in a wide band. A Deloitte study estimated roughly 4 million BTC held in P2PK or reused P2PKH addresses, while a 2025 Chaincode Labs paper estimated 4–10 million BTC across broader vulnerability categories. Glassnode’s 6.04 million figure sits within that range and applies narrower, more precisely defined criteria.
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